From Crash to Compromise: Unlocking the Potential of Windows Crash Dumps in Offensive Security
A look into how how Windows crash dump files—often ignored in offensive operations—can be weaponized to extract sensitive data like credentials and encryption keys without noisy memory dumping techniques, while also exploring detection strategies for defenders.
What if Windows was already doing your process dumping for you?
As part of my Master’s research at the SANS Technology Institute, I explored a simple, yet often overlooked truth: Windows crash dumps can be a goldmine for offensive operations.
Red teams are trained to think tactically—gain access, stay quiet, and extract valuable data without setting off alarms. We build tools to dump process memory, bypass security products, and harvest credentials from live systems.
But here’s the twist: Windows may have already done the heavy lifting for you.
Crash dump files, often viewed as forensic artifacts, are actually detailed memory snapshots. They can contain exactly what an attacker wants:
🔐 Plaintext credentials
🔑 Password hashes
🌐 Browser session tokens and password vaults
📄 Sensitive documents
These files often sit quietly on disk, generated automatically when something crashes. And many organizations don’t even realize they exist until disk space runs low.
Why risk dumping LSASS or touching monitored files when you can just exfiltrate a crash dump and extract secrets offline?
This became the core of my research: shifting crash dumps from a defensive artifact to an offensive asset. I focused on how attackers can use them for stealthy post-exploitation—and how defenders can detect their presence before they become a liability.
If you’re in red teaming, threat detection, DFIR, or just curious about unconventional post-exploitation techniques, I’d love to hear your take.
How are you thinking about memory artifacts like these in your work?
